lost rights, status, or position, strained to look behind the curtain (as it were) to see who it was that conspired against their welfare. Historical perspective helps only a little, because in fact there were conspirators and geniuses both. Like all profound and complicated cultural changes, the market revolution offers up a cast of leading characters but also an uncounted host of bit players, members of a chorus who may or may not have even recognized their part in what was happening.
The sheer abundance of land and resources in North America contributed enormously to the outcome, although most persons at the time took the generosity of nature for granted. The general liberation produced by the American Revolution, celebrating liberty, equality, and property rights, gave ambitious individuals free access to those resources while it stayed the hand of kings or governors who might have restrained them. Depending on your view of human nature, competitive individualism may seem the natural result of removing controls or an unnatural instinct cultivated by a system of rewards and punishments. Either way, the market revolution proceeded on a very broad front, coopting a majority-willingly or not-and planting in the popular mind a belief in "natural" economic laws as irreducible as gravity itself.
Three old colonial habits and one relatively new expediency helped provide the energy that followed American independence. Pioneering quite literally had defi ned the American experiment since the fi rst settlers landed at Jamestown. Unlike Old Europe, where people stayed rooted in place for generations on end, Americans became Americans by pulling up stakes and venturing out into unknown lands. Children came of age in British North America assuming that they too would seize new land and bring it into production. Similarly, innovation marked the lives of colonists who, try as they might, never could reproduce traditional ways and means of living in the New World. Historians now commonly portray our eighteenth-century ancestors as disappointed by the ways in which they failed to reproduce British society. But in passing through the crucible of revolution, most of them came to see their makeshift, make-do habits of invention as a virtue rather than a vice. Finally, slavery-the rankest exploitation of labor for commercial gain-had typifi ed economic life in the colonies since the starving times of the 1600s. After fi ve or six generations of buying and selling "hands" (in the case of Africans, with whole bodies attached), Americans had grown comfortable with separating labor as a factor of production from the rights and privileges of laborers as persons. The new expediency can be seen in the ease with which post-revolutionary entrepreneurs extended the exploitation once reserved for convicts, bound servants, and slaves to members of their own communities and households-women, children, and other free men.
Give people who have been conditioned to a life of pioneering, innovation, and the exploitation of labor free access to a continent of underdeveloped resources, limited only by governments of their own devising, in a world already steeped in commerce and tasting industrialization, and we should not be surprised to see a market revolution. But people were surprised, in large part because what seemed to them "traditional" behaviors suddenly gave birth to a new system of anonymous transactions that exploded the face-to-face, embedded cultural communities in which those traditional habits had prevailed. The façade of hierarchy, prerogative, and social deference was quickly ripped away after the Revolution in America. High mobility, political equality, and economic opportunity tended to cut people loose from ancestral homes and values and encourage them to reinvent themselves in new places pursuing new occupations. America's famous "rootlessness" had begun.
Living among strangers now, mobile Americans had no choice but to fi nd goods and services in markets where their own good name derived from honoring contracts and nothing else. People selling goods saw no benefi t in fl attering "gentlemen" with discounts and privileges when all stood equal before the law and the ballot box. Buyers just as quickly lost their loyalty to local vendors and producers when lower prices lured them into stores fi lled with goods from who-knows-where.
Negative consequences popped up all over the United States in the early years of the market revolution, but few people seemed to recognize their common origin or the signifi cance of what they foretold. Pioneer farmers, whose wives gave up the spinning wheel and loom to purchase cloth from the dry goods merchant, found themselves bound to cash crops whose prices fl uctuated wildly as the game progressed. New England farm girls took advantage of cash wages in the well-ordered boardinghouse systems of the Lowell mills, only to fi nd the market squeezing down their incomes while their chances for marriage slipped quietly away. Planters on worn-out tobacco farms may have felt paternalistic toward their "black families," but their sons nevertheless took those slaves to the cotton or sugar frontier where their worth (and their hardships) dramatically increased. Craftsmen making shoes and hats and hardware struggled to meet burgeoning demand in the American domestic trade, inventing in the process what their journeymen called the "bastard workshop," where men in their thirties with families still labored for wages better suited to single teenagers. Everyone was knit together in a web of credits that unraveled whenever money grew tight, confi dence waned, or world prices for corn and cotton suddenly dipped. Voices of protest could be heard everywhere, but seldom in harmony, except during panics when hostility was aimed at banks and politicians-neither one of which really controlled most of what was going on. For generations what we now call the market revolution was known to history and its teachers simply as "progress," the story of the rising success of the American nation. Freed by their rebellion from the "corrupt" institutions of king, class, and established church, Americans blossomed as nature intended in their pastoral wilderness, multiplying riches in Biblical proportions. This naïve perspective was itself a product of the market revolution, of the liberal ideology that gave supremacy to free exchange and individual self-determination over all other bonds and obligations. For this reason, most texts and monographs written before the 1960s saw little need to explain the triumph of capitalist relations in America: what had happened was what ought to be. Historians puzzled over the primacy of stimulating factors: Was it the presence of "free land" on the frontier? Some kind of technological genius born of hardship and necessity? The spirit of Protestant religiosity? A manifestation of middle-class ambitions unchecked by aristocracy? But only occasional Marxists really questioned the benevolence of American economic development-and their ideological convictions were thought to be perverse.
The result of this widespread consensus was a literature more descriptive than analytical, epitomized by a nine volume Economic History of the United States started in 1947 that included Curtis Nettels, The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775 Economy, -1815 Economy, (1962 ; George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815 -1860 (1951 ; Paul Wallace Gates, The Farmer's Age: Agriculture, 1815 Agriculture, -1860 Agriculture, (1960 ; and Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, and Public Policy, 1860 -1897 (1961 . Some scholars did probe the causal connections between politics and economics in such works as Commonwealth: A Study of Settlers, such as these depicted in the engraving "Spring--Burning fallen trees in a girdled clearing," built cabins and created fi elds on the so-called "empty" This convergence of scholarly trends set the stage for the present generation's debates about the market revolution-and it framed the central dilemma in the literature. At least sentimentally, the pre-modern economic order seems "good," while ruthless capitalism seems "bad"; but monarchy is "bad" and democracy is "good." American history as morality tale was coming apart at the seams. As a result, teachers seeking to read up on the market revolution will encounter some surprisingly contentious literature about things they did not know were quite so controversial. (This essay may serve as something of a guide to the innocent as they enter this academic thicket.)
Most recent writings have tended to cluster in camps, one around the theoretical promises of neoclassical economic theory and the tech-
